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Non-technical summary 
 
The development of international airline markets has led to the dominance of three global 
airline alliances – Star, SkyTeam and oneworld. As part of an overall assessment of the 
competitive effects of such agreements, the theoretical literature has suggested that 
members of an international airline partnership might have an incentive to foreclose the 
beyond-the-gateway markets to the airlines excluded from the respective alliance. It has 
also been suggested that such foreclosure will likely be most effective when alliance 
partners have the right to jointly set fares for the interline services, and engage in revenue 
sharing arrangements – a privilege otherwise known as antitrust immunity. This paper 
analyzes and quantifies effects of such market foreclosure. 
 We conduct an extensive analysis of the data on non-stop services on the transatlantic 
scheduled commercial passenger airline market. Merging the data with the information 
on the structure of the airlines’ networks and dynamics of the airline partnerships on the 
same market over the time period from 1992 to 2008, we are able to analyze whether the 
airlines enjoying antitrust immunity take steps to exclude interline passengers arriving on 
the rival carriers’ flights. We find that antitrust immunity leads to a 2.5–6 percent (0.7–
1.5 percent in dynamic panel data GMM estimation) decrease in frequency of service by 
the non-alliance carriers serving a newly immunized hub. The effect on the passenger 
volumes is even greater (4.8 to 8.5 percent drop in fixed effects, 2.6 to 3.5 percent in 
GMM; and generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency). This suggests that excluded 
airlines switch to smaller aircrafts and/or end up with lower load factors on their services 
to the newly immunized hubs. We also find evidence (less robust, however) that antitrust 
immunity may lead to lower passenger volumes on routes between the competing 
alliances’ hubs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die Marktentwicklungen im internationalen Luftverkehr haben zur Dominanz dreier 
großer und global agierender Allianzen von Fluggesellschaften geführt – Star, SkyTeam 
und oneworld. Als Teil einer ganzheitlichen Untersuchung der wettbewerblichen Effekte 
solcher Allianzen hat die theoretische Literatur die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass die 
Mitglieder einer solchen Allianz möglicherweise einen Anreiz haben, Märkte für 
Zubringerflüge für Fluggesellschaften zu verschließen, die nicht Mitglied in der 
jeweiligen Allianz sind. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch behauptet, dass die 
Implementierung solcher Abschottungsstrategien dann am effektivsten ist, wenn die 
Allianzmitglieder die Preise der Interline-Verbindungen absprechen und die dadurch 
generierten Umsätze untereinander aufteilen dürfen – also Antitrust-Immunität genießen. 
Dieser Aufsatz analysiert und quantifiziert die Effekte einer solchen Form der 
Abschottung in Luftverkehrsmärkten. 
 Wir führen eine umfassende empirische Analyse auf Basis von Daten für direkte 
Linienflüge für Passagiere im transatlantischen Markt zwischen Europa und den USA 
durch. Durch die Zusammenführung dieser Daten mit Daten zur Struktur der 
Streckennetze der Fluggesellschaften und der dynamischen Entwicklung der 
Luftverkehrsallianzen für den Zeitraum von 1992 bis 2008 sind wir in der Lage zu 
untersuchen, ob die Fluggesellschaften mit Antitrust-Immunität Schritte unternehmen, die 
Interlining-Passagiere von außenstehenden Fluggesellschaften auszuschließen. Die 
Ergebnisse der Untersuchung zeigen, dass die Gewährung von Antitrust-Immunität zu 
einer 2,5-6%-igen Reduktion der Flugfrequenzen (zu den jeweiligen ‚immunisierten 
Drehkreuzen’) derjenigen Fluggesellschaften führt, die nicht der betreffenden Allianz 
angehören. Der Effekt auf das Passagieraufkommen ist noch deutlicher. Es findet sich ein  
Rückgang zwischen 4,8% und 8,5% bei der ‚fixed effects’ Modellierung bzw. zwischen 
2,6% und 3,5% bei GMM. Grundsätzlich ist der Effekt auf das Passagieraufkommen 1,5 
bis 2 Mal stärker als bei den Flugfrequenzen. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass 
abgeschottete Fluggesellschaften zu kleineren Flugzeugen wechseln oder aber niedrigere 
Auslastungen ihrer Flüge zu den jeweiligen ‚immunisierten Drehkreuzen’ zu verzeichnen 
haben. Darüber hinaus finden wir (wenn auch schwächere) Belege dafür, dass die 
Gewährung von Antitrust-Immunität zu einem niedrigeren Passgieraufkommen auf 
Strecken zwischen im Wettbewerb stehenden Drehkreuzen führt.      
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust 
immunity.  Overlapping the data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on non-
stop routes on the transatlantic airline market with the information on dynamics of airline 
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immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the carriers outside of the 
partnership at respective hub airports.  When an airline partnership is granted antitrust 
immunity, airlines outside this partnership end up reducing their traffic to the partner 
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technique involved).  Our results suggest ambiguous welfare effects of antitrust immunity 
on some markets, where previous studies indicated airline consolidation should benefit 
consumers. 
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“[I]t has become much harder to negotiate good deals for 
flights from Paris and Frankfurt since immunity was 
granted.” 
Travel manager of a big European Bank (2009)1 
 
1.  Introduction 
A crucial feature of the airline industry is that the level of demand on most city-pair 
markets is not sufficient to sustain regular non-stop services.  The airlines’ response has 
been to operate hub-and-spoke networks, channeling passengers via one or several 
airports (hubs).  While in the US domestic airline industry most of the travelers do not 
have to change the operating carrier en route, the situation is very different on the 
international markets, where scale and regulatory restrictions do not allow setting up 
‘mega-airlines’ with networks encompassing the entire world.  The carriers’ response has 
been to form partnerships to facilitate interline trips by the consumers.  A number of such 
partnerships on the routes originating from the USA operate under ‘antitrust immunity’, 
which allows the carriers to jointly make scheduling and pricing decisions on the 
corresponding joint networks; revenue sharing is also allowed.2 
 International airline partnerships operating under antitrust immunity provide a 
nice setup for an empirical investigation of market foreclosure – a practice that generally 
involves denying the actual or potential competitors access to either an essential input or 
customers, thereby preventing them from competing.  Antitrust immunity can lead to 
market foreclosure, as respective alliance members will be reluctant to accept interline 
passengers from the outside airlines.  In fact, such a concern has been specifically raised 
by American Airlines – the carrier claimed that it has become more difficult for it to feed 
its passengers to Air France’s flights at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport following the 
granting of antitrust immunity to the Air France – Delta partnership within the Skyteam 
alliance3.  Foreclosing on the outside carriers is a perfectly rational strategy for the 
alliance members, as it not only increases their revenue (the passenger spends all his/her 
                                                 
1 All together now – Why antitrust immunity granted in Washington may not wash in Europe, The 
Economist, Oct 29th 2009.  
2 Although we will use the term ‘antitrust immunity’ (which refers to US antitrust laws) throughout the 
paper, our analysis also applies to the European context. 
3 Report of James D. Reitzes, Dorothy Robyn & Kevin Neels (The Brattle Group), Docket No. OST-2004-
19214, (June 24, 2005). 
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money ‘within’ the alliance), but also lowers their cost via economies of traffic density 
(and increases the rivals’ cost for the same reason)4.  Foreclosure strategies can be 
implemented either by a direct refusal to deal, or by setting prohibitively high fees for 
accepting such passengers.  Whatever the exact mechanism, the end result will be higher 
traffic by the partner airlines with antitrust immunity and lower traffic by the outside 
airlines on routes to/from the partner airlines’ hub airports.  This is the contention tested 
in this study.5 
 We find clear support for our hypothesis in the data.  Our estimation results 
indicate that outside airlines carry up to eight percent fewer passengers to immunized 
alliance members’ hubs as compared to other routes within their networks.  At the same 
time, antitrust immunity increases traffic on routes operated by the respective member 
airlines out of their hubs by over four percent (as compared to the otherwise equal outside 
airlines’ services), and leads to a dramatic (up to 25 percent) increase in total passenger 
volume on the routes between the alliance members’ hub airports.  The same effects, 
however less robust and half the size of those estimated for the passenger volumes, are 
observed for the frequency of flights.  Traffic between the hubs of competing alliances 
(another category of markets where foreclosure is possible) is generally similar to that of 
the outside airlines.  Net effects (in terms of passenger volumes and frequency of service) 
of this foreclosure vary for different categories of markets, and are either ambiguous (at 
worst implying a small reduction in traffic with potentially anti-competitive outcomes), 
or indicate higher total traffic.  A detailed welfare analysis is outside the scope of this 
study, as comprehensive pricing data for international airline markets are not available.  
However, we are able to point to cases where foreclosure stipulated by the antitrust 
immunity may hurt consumers on certain routes. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section is a primer 
on the antitrust economics of market foreclosure, followed by an overview of the role of 
antitrust immunity for airline alliances. This is complemented by a discussion of the link 
                                                 
4 On the margin, if a connecting passenger comes from within your alliance rather than from the outside, 
your load factor increases, and that of your rival falls, which (due to economies of traffic density) increases 
the difference between your per passenger cost and your rival’s. 
5 Among others, Reitzes and Moss (2008) identify anti-competitive foreclosure as the result of antitrust 
immunity to airline alliances as a policy relevant issue.    
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between foreclosure and airline partnerships. Subsequently, we describe the data, present 
and discuss the data analysis results, and conclude.  Some of the information and tables 
are in the Appendix. 
 
2.  Market Foreclosure and Antitrust: Fundamentals 
Market foreclosure involves denying actual or potential competitors access to either an 
essential input or customers, and thereby preventing them from competing.  The tools in 
the foreclosing firm’s toolbox include vertical integration with competitors, refusal to 
deal, exclusive arrangements, and price discrimination.  In either case, the visible 
outcome of such interaction is lower quantity (market share) of the firm being foreclosed 
on.  The general concept of foreclosure can be of relevance in no fewer than four areas of 
antitrust policy: mergers and acquisitions, monopolization, vertical restraints, and 
horizontal agreements (Steuer, 2008).  With respect to mergers and acquisitions, we can 
distinguish between input foreclosure and customer foreclosure.  Input foreclosure 
involves the upstream firm restricting access to its input to the downstream rivals.  This 
raises downstream rivals’ costs and so reduces competition at the downstream level, 
leading to higher prices downstream.  In the case of customer foreclosure, the 
downstream firm restricts its purchases from upstream firm’s rivals, leading to the loss of 
economies of scale – and therefore higher prices – for the upstream rivals.  This in turn 
allows the downstream firms to raise their prices.  Although both theoretical concepts are 
based on sound economics (Ordover, Salop & Saloner (1990, 1992); Riordan (1998)), 
antitrust investigations need to show the ability to foreclose, the incentive to foreclose, 
and whether such a foreclosure strategy would have a significant detrimental effect on 
competition downstream (European Commission, Non-horizontal merger guidelines, 
para. 32).  Generally, foreclosure as such is not necessarily an anti-competitive practice, 
but may very well be socially beneficial in certain circumstances such as free-riding by 
the downstream units or excessive entry (Rey and Tirole, 2007). 
 In fact, empirical studies of market foreclosure generally point to the dominance 
of the pro-competitive effects of this practice.  Mullin and Mullin (1997) argue that US 
Steel’s acquisition of one of its suppliers led to substantial efficiency gains rather than 
market foreclosure.  Slade (1998) shows that divestiture of pubs by breweries – effective 
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removal of possibility of foreclosure – yielded higher prices for beer at pubs.  More 
recently, Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) found no evidence of anti-competitive effects of 
vertical foreclosure in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries; instead, the 
authors suggest that vertical integration yields lower prices, higher quantity, and does not 
create any additional entry barriers.  Shenoy (2008), using an event study analysis 
covering a large sample of mergers, claims that efficiency is the main rationale for 
mergers.  Derdenger (2009) studies foreclosure in the video game console industry, and 
suggests it is pro-competitive.  An opposing side is represented by Hastings’ (2004) study 
of the gasoline market in Southern California. The author showed that the takeover of 
independent Thrifty stations by ARCO resulted in higher gasoline prices at the nearby 
stations, indicating lower competition following the vertical integration.   
 
3.  Airline Alliances and Antitrust Immunity 
Airline partnerships are not a recent development in the commercial passenger airline 
industry.  Capacity, cost and revenue sharing arrangements have been commonly wired 
into the bilateral air service agreements regulating (and severely restricting) competition 
on the international markets since World War II.  Airline partnerships in their modern 
form started appearing in the early 1990s, with airlines coordinating their handling of 
interline passengers via agreements of various types.  The most common and policy 
relevant form of such agreements involves codesharing, whereby flights are assigned the 
partner airlines’ flight number(s), and are effectively incorporated into those carriers’ 
networks.  Such services are oftentimes jointly marketed by the partner airlines, and are 
sometimes supplemented with blocked-space arrangements, whereby a certain number of 
seats on the flight are sold directly by the partner airline.  Multi-airline codesharing 
agreements led to emergence of the global airline alliances, each of which started from a 
partnership between a US and an EU carrier.  Oneworld developed around the partnership 
between American Airlines and British Airways; Skyteam evolved from the Delta Air 
Lines – Air France alliance; and the current Star Alliance is the expanded United Airlines 
– Lufthansa partnership. 
 Looking for more freedom to coordinate various aspects of their joint operations, 
the partner airlines sought antitrust immunity, or the right to jointly set fares throughout 
 6
their international networks, as well as to establish revenue-sharing agreements.  This 
aspect of the airline partnerships is actually not understood too well in the literature.  A 
number of theoretical models (e.g. Park, 1997, Brueckner, 2001, Brueckner and Whalen, 
2000) model the alliances as effective mergers.  Of the empirical studies of international 
airline partnerships (Oum et al., 1996, Park and Zhang, 2000, Brueckner and Whalen, 
2000, Whalen, 2007, Brueckner, 2003) only the latter two attempt to empirically 
distinguish the effect of the antitrust immunity on airfares. 
 Between 1992 and 2009, the US DOT investigated 35 applications for antitrust 
immunity for the international services of various airline alliances.6 Only three 
applications were disapproved7 by the US DOT, two are pending (as of February 2009), 
and two applications were dismissed on request of the airlines before a final decision was 
announced. All of the remaining 28 applications were approved subject to conditions. 
Excluding the twelve applications of alliances without any involvement of a European 
carrier leaves 16 approved transatlantic applications for antitrust immunity.  All antitrust 
immunity granting decisions that fall into the time period covered by our data are 
described in the Appendix.8 
 Antitrust immunity represents a higher degree of cooperation than codesharing 
agreements, and changes the airlines’ incentives with respect to the acceptance of 
interline passengers. While codesharing – either with or without antitrust immunity – 
does not technically preclude an airline from accepting interline passengers from the non-
partner airlines, immunity makes market foreclosure more likely.  An airline accepting an 
interline passenger on its flight both increases its revenue and lowers per passenger cost 
via economies of traffic density.  Antitrust immunity, when supplemented with a revenue 
                                                 
6 The only domestic airline alliance investigated by the DOT was between Aloha Airlines and Hawaiian 
Airlines in 2002. 
7 American Airlines - British Airways (1999), American Airlines - British Airways (2002), Delta Air Lines 
- Northwest Airlines - Air France - Alitalia - CSA Czech Airlines - KLM (2006) 
8 Between 1994 and 2008, the European Commission investigated 21 cases of proposed airline alliances. 
However, 10 out of the 21 cases had a solely European focus and are therefore of no particular interest 
here. Of the remaining 11 transatlantic alliance applications, at the beginning of 2010 four applications 
(including the three remaining global alliances) are still awaiting their final decisions, two applications 
became dormant due to DOT’s dismissal, two became obsolete as the partnership ended before a decision 
was made, and one application was extended to the current SkyTeam investigation. In sum, there appears to 
be only one transatlantic alliance that was approved subject to conditions (Lufthansa-SAS-United in 2002). 
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sharing agreement, is equivalent to joint profit maximization9, and therefore strongly 
discourages accepting interline passengers from outside airlines.  Even in case of antitrust 
immunity without explicit network-wide revenue sharing10, partner airlines can share the 
revenue from the interline fares in such a way as to foreclose the market for outside 
carriers.  Antitrust immunity allows the partner airlines to effectively set “transfer prices” 
for the interline itineraries within the alliance.  As an example, suppose airline A can feed 
its traffic to either carrier B or C.  Suppose the total fares for the A-B and A-C interline 
trips are the same.  Then, if airlines A and B have antitrust immunity, they can split the 
interline fares in such a way that airline A obtains a disproportionately large share of the 
total interline fare for feeding its passengers to its partner carrier B.  This arrangement 
can be reciprocal, so that airline B will recoup the losses by receiving the 
disproportionately large share of the total fare for feeding traffic to airline A.  This kind 
of “transfer prices” can eliminate the non-alliance airline C as a competitor. 
 Note that with a simple codesharing the above described agreement is not 
feasible, as explicit coordination of prices for the interline trips is not allowed.  Besides, it 
should be noted that the non-acceptance of the interline passengers from carriers outside 
of the immunized alliance increases the respective airlines’ cost due to lower load factors, 
again working through economies of traffic density. 
 
4.  Antitrust Immunity and Foreclosure 
The possibility of foreclosure in airline partnerships has been suggested by Chen and 
Gayle (2007), and Bilotkach (2007).  Both papers model alliances with antitrust 
immunity and profit sharing.  In either model, where an airline can choose from a variety 
of potential alliance partners, the airline not chosen as a partner is unable to carry its 
passengers beyond its network.  This issue is illustrated in Figure 1, depicting the 
network structure borrowed from Bilotkach (2007).  Over this network, Airline 1 
effectively forecloses the A-to-C market to Airline 3 upon setting up the alliance with 
Airline 2. 
                                                 
9 For more details on revenue sharing agreements within airline alliances, see Brueckner and Proost (2009). 
10 With revenue sharing, partner airlines may split revenue not only from the interline, but also from the on-
line (i.e., single-airline) passengers. 
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 From the practical point of view, vertical foreclosure need not involve outright 
refusal to accept the interline passengers from anyone except the alliance partner.  What 
changes once the two airlines start cooperating is the ability to remove double 
marginalization for their interline services.  Antitrust immunity is a sufficient (but 
potentially not a necessary) condition for such a removal of double marginalization. Most 
studies of airline consolidation do not formally distinguish between alliances with and 
without antitrust immunity; and some papers (e.g., Bilotkach, 2005; Bilotkach and 
Hüschelrath, 2010) suggest the possibility for the alliance without antitrust immunity to 
yield the removal of double marginalization.  Yet, as we discussed above, antitrust 
immunity allows explicit price coordination, and gives the partner airlines a possibility to 
either set up a joint venture with revenue sharing or split the total interline fares to restrict 
interlining outside of their network whenever possible.  In addition, Reitzes and Moss 
(2008) note that foreclosure will be more successful the higher the gateway’s reliance on 
connecting traffic and the fewer the options for channeling passengers via alternative hub 
airports.  They further suggest that the current structure of the transatlantic airline 
industry appears more conducive to foreclosure at EU rather than US gateways, due to 
the relative dominance of EU countries’ flag carriers on the respective domestic markets. 
 
Figure 1: Network with choice of alliance partner 
 
The above-stated immediately suggests a simple hypothesis for detecting foreclosure 
following an airline partnership.  Namely, foreclosure will entail non-alliance carriers 
lowering their traffic from/into an alliance hub; while alliance members would increase 
this traffic.  This point is illustrated in Figure 2, which breaks down non-stop transatlantic 
traffic at Frankfurt airport (FRA) by operating carriers’ affiliation with the Star Alliance 
partnerships that enjoy antitrust immunity.  We can clearly see that Star Alliance traffic 
Airline 1 Airline 2 
Airline 3 
A B C 
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has been increasing over the years, while transatlantic traffic by the airlines outside of 
Star Alliance has been declining or constant11. 
Transatlantic Passengers at FRA 
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Note: Computed from T-100 dataset (see data section of the paper).  LH = Lufthansa; UA = United; the two 
airlines have antitrust immunity since 1996.  Services between to UA hubs include non-stop flights to 
Washington Dulles, Chicago O’Hare, Denver, and San Francisco by United or Lufthansa. 
 
Figure 2: Non-stop transatlantic passenger traffic at Frankfurt airport 
Let us now examine which markets can be affected by foreclosure at hub airports of the 
immunized alliance members.  Figure 3 depicts a simple network with two competing 
airline alliances.  Airports S1, H1, and H2 are located across the Atlantic Ocean from H3, 
H4, and S2.  Let us call the partnership between the airlines operating hubs H1 and H3 
Alliance 1; while Alliance 2 members will operate hubs H2 and H4.  Then we can define 
the following types of international markets: 
- Markets between the hubs within an Alliance: H1-H3 and H2-H4 routes; 
- Markets between the hubs of competing Alliances: H1-H4 and H2-H3; 
- Spoke-overseas hub routes: S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1, and S2-H2; note that in 
addition to one-stop flight possibilities, we may also have non-stop flights on 
these markets (not singled out here to keep Figure 3 as simple as possible). 
                                                 
11 Note that while Star Alliance membership has grown over the years, Star Alliance transatlantic services 
with antitrust immunity to/from Frankfurt airport have been performed by either Lufthansa or United. US 
Airways, while a member of Star Alliance, has not had antitrust immunity, and therefore its services are 
included into the “other airlines” category in Figure 2. 
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- Spoke-spoke routes: S1-S2. 
 
Figure 3: Simple Network with Two Alliances 
 
Market foreclosure will yield a reduction of traffic on H1-H4 and H2-H3 routes.  Spoke-
overseas hubs routes may also be affected.  Consider the S1-H3 market.  In the extreme 
case, Alliance 2 may end up closing down the H2-H3 segment of its network (as it is 
unable to operate this market profitably without passengers connecting to spokes via H3).  
Even if the segment is not closed down (so that alliance members only reduce frequency 
of service), the position of Alliance 2 on the S1-H3 route looks less favorable when 
compared to Alliance 1.  At the same time, the reduction in competition on these routes 
can be offset by the lower cost; therefore, the net effect on prices is generally uncertain. 
 Spoke-to-spoke markets (S1-S2) are not affected much by foreclosure, as 
competition between the airlines is simply replaced by the competition between alliances. 
It is however true that the S1-S2 passengers will now have fewer options, as routings S1-
H1-H4-S2 and S1-H2-H3-S2 are no longer available to them. 
 In addition to the markets depicted in Figure 3, foreclosure may affect non-stop 
transatlantic traffic from the alliance hubs to gateway points other than hubs across the 
ocean.  Such routes are important to the extent that they are served by the airlines which 
are not members of either of the two alliances – those carriers may be foreclosed on, 
leading to lower competition. 
 The net effect of competition between the alliances is increased specialization of 
individual alliance members on channeling the passenger traffic via the alliance partners’ 
hubs, and reduction in traffic to the competing alliance’s hub airports.  While over the 
entire network the effect of this network reorganization could be to increase the number 
of markets served, and competition between the alliances may intensify (especially on the 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
S1 
S2 
Alliance 1
Alliance 2
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spoke-to-spoke markets); we have identified some markets where competition will be 
decreased.  Specifically, those markets include all routes originating and terminating at 
the hub airport of an immunized alliance member.  Our conclusion is actually quite 
different from the approach regulators have up to now applied to antitrust immunity, 
where only routes between alliance members’ hubs have been considered susceptible to 
reduced competition with antitrust immunity.  Last but not least, not all airlines are 
alliance members and the formation of airline alliances puts those carriers into a clearly 
disadvantageous position, also decreasing competition on the affected markets.  As an 
example, if we suppose that the H3-S2 route is also served by a non-alliance carrier, the 
formation of the alliance will decrease competition in this market. 
 In the end, we can formulate the following testable hypotheses.  First, we expect 
the airlines without antitrust immunity protection to serve fewer flights and carry fewer 
passengers (as compared to what they offer elsewhere on their network) on markets 
involving hub airports of members of alliances that enjoy antitrust immunity.  Second, 
antitrust immunity is expected to yield lower traffic between the hub airports of members 
of competing alliances. 
 
5.  Data 
5.1 Sample and Key Variables 
Our main data source is the T-100 dataset for international airline services provided by 
the US Department of Transportation. This dataset includes monthly information on all 
non-stop services between the USA and the rest of the world.  Each entry contains 
information about the segment’s endpoints, operating carrier, and monthly totals for the 
number of departures performed, seats offered, and passengers carried on this particular 
segment.  From this dataset we have selected data for travel between the USA and all 
current EU members, plus Switzerland and Norway, for the years 1992 to 2008.  We have 
retained only passenger services, yet eliminated services with fewer than ten monthly 
departures.12  Overall, we ended up with 51,896 observations, spanning 377 non-
                                                 
12 Since we defined markets as not directional, ten departures actually correspond to five flights each way, 
or about one scheduled flight per week. 
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directional13 airport-pair markets and 796 airline-market combinations between 38 US 
and 57 European airports.   
 Our key independent variables will be types of airline services, defined according 
to both the airline’s membership in an alliance enjoying the antitrust immunity, and the 
endpoints’ status as a hub in one or the other airline’s network.  Specifically, we 
differentiate between: 
- Immunized alliance members’ services between their respective hub airports (e.g., 
KLM flight from Amsterdam to Detroit); we will call those “Services between 
immunized hubs” 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to a hub airport of a 
competing alliance with antitrust immunity (e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to 
Chicago O’Hare after Star Alliance obtained antitrust immunity); to be denoted 
“Services between competitors’ hubs” 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to airports which do 
not serve as hubs for any immunized alliance member (e.g., KLM service from 
Amsterdam to Boston); we will refer to those as “Other immunized alliance services” 
- Services to immunized alliance members’ hub airports by airlines which are 
themselves not immunized alliance members (e.g., British Airways services to such 
airports such as Chicago O’Hare, Denver, Washington Dulles, etc.).  This category 
will be called “Other services to alliance hubs”. 
These four categories combined encompass (in 2008) up to 70 percent of all non-stop 
services in the dataset, as evident from Figure 4.  That figure starts from 1996 rather than 
1992, as 1996 is the first full year when we observe several competing alliances with 
antitrust immunity (KLM-Northwest partnership; Delta–Swissair–Sabena–Austrian 
Airlines partnership; as well as Lufthansa-United and Lufthansa-SAS immunity within 
Star Alliance).  It can be observed that between 1996 and 2002 there has been a steady 
growth in the share of services involving hubs of alliance partnerships with antitrust 
immunity; since then this share has stabilized at about 70 percent.  This implies that 
seven out of ten flights on the transatlantic markets (US-EU plus Norway and 
                                                 
13 This means that JFK-Heathrow traffic is lumped together with Heathrow-JFK passengers. 
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Switzerland) involve either one or two airports used as hubs by the airlines participating 
in partnerships with antitrust immunity. 
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Note: Market shares are based on frequency of service; shares based on number of passengers carried and 
seats offered are similar. 
 
Figure 4: Market Share of Services Involving Hubs of Alliances with Immunity 
 
To correctly classify the services in line with the above categories, we need information 
on both the airlines’ hub airports and the timeline of antitrust immunity decisions.  In 
addition, we know that some of the airline partnerships which had been granted antitrust 
immunity were eventually dissolved; therefore it was necessary to determine the 
corresponding timeline as well.  US DOT’s decisions on granting of antitrust immunity 
are publicly available; we used them to construct the timeline presented in the Appendix.  
Internet research revealed the dates of dissolution of partnerships.  For the purpose of 
data analysis, we considered immunized alliances as operational starting from the month 
following the granting of antitrust immunity until either the month in which the 
partnership was dissolved or (for currently active alliances) the end of 2008. 
 Hub airports have been designated based on the structure of the airlines’ 
networks.  EU airlines’ hubs mostly corresponded to the respective countries’ capitals 
(except for Lufthansa, which operates hubs at both Frankfurt and Munich airports; 
Alitalia, using both Rome Fuimicino and Milan Malpensa as hubs; and SAS, operating 
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hubs at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo).  For the US airlines participating in airline 
partnerships with antitrust immunity, we have designated the following airports as hubs: 
- American Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Ft. Worth, Miami 
- United Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Denver, San Francisco, Washington D.C. (Dulles 
airport) 
- Northwest Airlines: Detroit, Minneapolis, Memphis 
- Delta Air Lines: Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City,14 New York JFK 
 
5.2 Control Variables 
In the data analysis that follows, we will use the following control variables.  At the 
country level, we include data on the volume of trade between the USA and each of the 
European countries, as well as the information on whether there is a Visa Waiver 
Program15 in effect for a given European country, and whether there is an Open Skies 
Agreement16 in place.  All three - higher trade volume, Visa Waiver Program and Open 
Skies Agreement – are expected to yield higher travel volumes between the US and a 
foreign country.  However, the effect of each of these variables at the individual route 
level is uncertain, as airlines may open up new routes to a country in response to each of 
these factors; and the travel volume on some ‘older’ routes may decline (e.g., if an airline 
starts serving Stuttgart in addition to Frankfurt, some passengers which used to fly to 
Frankfurt will now go to Stuttgart, so the passenger volume on flights to Frankfurt may 
decrease). 
 The market-level control variables include geometric averages of endpoints’ per 
capita income and population; as well as the airport-pair market level Herfindahl index 
(we will use the index based on passenger volumes). 
                                                 
14 There have been no transatlantic services out of Salt Lake City until 2008. 
15 The Visa Waiver Program was introduced in 1986 and allows citizens of certain countries to visit the 
USA for tourism or business purposes for up to 90 days without avisa.  Of the current EU members, only 
Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus are not participating in this program. 
16 Prior to the provisional opening of the Open Aviation Area to include US and EU (covering Switzerland 
and Norway as well), the US signed Open Skies Agreements with individual countries.  An Open Skies 
Agreement removes all barriers to entry with non-stop services between the US and a foreign country, 
except for the “nationality clause” (i.e., airlines operating such services had to be owned and effectively 
controlled by nationals of either of the two countries). 
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 Airline indicator variables will be used where appropriate to control for the 
airline-specific effects.  Time-specific heterogeneity will be controlled for by year and 
month indicator variables.  The following Table includes descriptive statistics on our 
variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Monthly frequency 66.59 44.02 11.00 494.00 
Monthly passengers 13,304.17 10,121.67 101.00 107,457.00 
Monthly seats 17,713.43 12,828.48 392.00 145,576.00 
Between immunized hubs 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Other immunized alliance 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Between competitors' hubs 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Other to alliance hubs 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
HHI 0.71 0.28 0.18 1.00 
Visa Waiver Program 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Trade volume (million US$) 53,539.63 35,645.67 399.60 152,001.00 
Open Skies Agreement 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
6.  Data Analysis and Results 
6.1 Methodology 
Our main hypothesis is that members of airline partnerships with antitrust immunity will 
have an incentive to block feeder traffic from the airlines that are not part of their 
alliance.  This can be operationalized via direct refusal, increased interlining fees for 
accepting passengers of outside airlines, and/or attracting passengers from within the 
alliance due to price coordination authorized by the antitrust immunity.  In either case, we 
deal with foreclosure of markets beyond the alliance members’ hub airports to 
competitors. 
 In our data, foreclosure will show itself via lower frequency of service and 
passenger volumes, offered by the outside carriers to hub airports of members of the 
alliance with antitrust immunity.  Besides, routes between the competing alliance 
members’ hubs might be affected as well.  We will be able to directly test these 
hypotheses using our route classification outlined in the previous section.  Note that the 
baseline category in our sample consists of services performed by the airlines which are 
not members of the partnerships with antitrust immunity on routes that do not involve any 
of the alliance members’ hubs.  Thus, a negative coefficient on the indicator for services 
offered by the outside carriers to hub airports of members of the alliance with antitrust 
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immunity will mean that these airlines offer fewer flights to hubs of alliance members as 
compared to the identical routes elsewhere in their networks. 
 Our dataset is an unbalanced panel.  We thus can estimate the airport-pair market 
level and airline-airport pair level fixed effects.  The latter should give a better picture, as 
it will enable us to take better account of the fact that most carriers in our sample operate 
hub-and-spoke networks, so that frequency decisions are made taking into account 
demand not only on spoke-to-hub markets, but also on spoke-to-spoke routes.  In the 
airline-market fixed effect model, the effects we are interested in will be identified by the 
variation in the relevant variable within a given airline-market cross-section.  As an 
example, consider Delta Air Lines’ service from Atlanta to Vienna.  This service will be 
classified in the outside category before antitrust immunity was granted to the Delta – 
Austrian partnership (from January 1992 till June 1996); as well as after the partnership 
ended and before the Austrian – United pair obtained antitrust immunity within Star 
Alliance (April 2000 toJanuary 2001).  After Delta – Austrian obtained antitrust 
immunity and before their partnership ended (July 1996 to March 2000), this service will 
be classified as service between immunized hubs.  In the period from February 2001 until 
January 2002, Austrian was a member of a partnership with antitrust immunity, while 
Delta was not: this implies that Delta service from Atlanta to Vienna will be in the other 
service to alliance hubs category during this period.  In January 2002 Delta Air Lines 
itself became a part of an alliance with antitrust immunity.  From February 2002 until the 
end of 2008 (this is how far our dataset spans) Delta’s Atlanta – Vienna service will be in 
the service between competitors’ hubs category.  Overall, about one third of all airline-
market combinations in our sample move between the above-described categories at least 
once (the share is higher if we restrict our sample to services of ‘legacy’ carriers – see 
below for a relevant description). 
 Additionally, to take advantage of the dynamic panel data structure, we have 
estimated the system generalized method of moments (system GMM) estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995).  The Arellano – Bover estimator builds upon the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator that treats the model as a system of equations – one for 
each time period – where the predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences 
are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels.  The innovative idea in Arellano – 
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Bover was to add the original equations in levels to this system.  The model we report 
includes two lags of the respective dependent variable on the right-hand side, and third to 
sixth lags are used as instruments. 
 In addition to running regressions on the entire sample; we will perform a series 
of robustness checks for our results.  First, we will restrict our sample to services 
performed by the ‘legacy’ carriers; these include EU countries’ traditional flag carriers 
and major US airlines.  In this way, we eliminate services by smaller and charter carriers 
as well as by the airlines from other parts of the world (mostly Asian carriers) performing 
transatlantic services under the fifth freedom rights17.  This restriction decreased the 
number of observations by about twelve percent.  Second, we exclude services to/from 
the United Kingdom – by far the largest transatlantic market (at the country level).  This 
country’s flag carrier (British Airways) has faced a number of obstacles in trying to 
obtain antitrust immunity for its partnership with American Airlines, and travel between 
the US and the UK has been subject to some idiosyncratic rules, most notably entry 
restrictions at London Heathrow airport18.  Third, to make sure the airlines’ potentially 
non-random entry and exit decisions do not bias our results, we restricted our sample to 
services observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months.  This restriction constrained 
us to working with 93 airline-market combinations. 
 
6.2 Results 
Results of our data analysis exercise are presented in Tables 2 through 5.  Table 2 
includes results of the airport-pair-market fixed effects model; Tables 3 and 4 report 
airline-market fixed effects model results.  Tables 3 is essentially Table 2 with airline-
market fixed effects; Table 4 reports results for the sub-sample including ‘steady’ 
services (i.e., those observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months).  Table 5 reports 
the Arellano – Bover dynamic panel GMM estimation results. 
 The estimation results are consistent with the market foreclosure hypothesis, and 
are robust to excluding non-legacy carrier services, services to/from the United Kingdom, 
                                                 
17 Fifth freedom rights allow the airline to carry revenue passengers between foreign countries as part of the 
service to/from its own country (e.g., under the fifth freedom right Air India is allowed to carry London-
New York passengers on the respective segment of its New Delhi–London–New York service). 
18 Up to May 2008, two US (American and United) and two UK (British Airways and Virgin Atlantic) 
airlines were allowed to perform direct transatlantic services out of this airport. 
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and ‘sporadic’ services.  Specifically, fixed effects results suggest antitrust immunity 
leads to a 2.5 to 6 percent decrease in the frequency of service by the outside carriers 
serving the newly immunized hub (based on the airline-market fixed effects 
specifications).  The effect on the passenger volumes is even greater (a 4.8 to 8.5 percent 
drop, and generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency), suggesting excluded airlines 
switch to a smaller aircraft and/or end up with lower load factors on their services to the 
newly immunized hubs.  GMM estimation results indicate an effect of a smaller 
magnitude (0.7 to 1.5 percent for frequency, and 2.6 to 3.5 percent for passenger 
volume), while the ratio between the frequency and passenger volume effects is the same 
as for the fixed effects models. 
 Evidence of foreclosure on routes between the hub airports of competing 
partnerships with antitrust immunity is less robust.  From Table 3 we observe that 
members of partnerships with antitrust immunity change the frequency of their services 
to the competing partnerships’ hubs in line with how they make the same choices 
elsewhere on their networks (except for markets between the alliance members’ hubs, 
where the frequency of service increases dramatically following granting of antitrust 
immunity).  However, emergence of an alliance with antitrust immunity leads to a 3-5 
percent decrease in passenger volume to the newly immunized hub by the member of the 
competing immunized partnership.  The results in Table 4 are more consistent with 
market foreclosure on the markets between the competitors’ hub airports.  In general, if 
we compare results for the airlines included into and excluded from the airline 
partnerships with antitrust immunity, we see that the magnitudes of foreclosure effects 
are similar for the two groups of carriers, but the general level of both frequency and 
passenger volumes tends to be higher for the airlines included in an immunized 
partnership.  GMM estimation results indicate an interesting relationship: once the 
competing alliance is granted antitrust immunity, its direct rivals increase both 
frequencies of service and passenger volumes on flights to the respective hub airports.  
However, effect on passenger volumes is smaller than on flight frequency.  Further, 
notice that members of partnerships with antitrust immunity increase passenger volumes 
on other routes out of their hubs to a larger extent than on routes to the competing 
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alliance members’ hubs (despite similar effects on frequency of service).  This evidence 
can be viewed as consistent with market foreclosure, albeit to a small degree. 
 The results reported in Table 6 clearly indicate that the foreclosure effects 
manifest itself in the airlines’ load factors rather than the carriers’ choice of aircraft size, 
with the exception of routes between the competitors’ hubs.  This is understandable, as 
the carriers effectively face a lower bound on the size of aircraft which can be used for 
transatlantic services – one cannot fly those routes using aircrafts smaller than Boeing-
757 or 767, seating about 200 – 250 passengers. 
 Some of the control variables exhibit surprising behavior.  Most strikingly, the 
relationship between market concentration and frequency/passenger volumes is positive.  
This contradicts the findings of other recent research (e.g., Pai, 2010; Bilotkach, 2010; 
Bilotkach et al., 2010).  However, those other studies use different datasets, and examine 
airlines’ frequency choices in the unregulated airline industry; in our case, entry 
restrictions are present, at least in the form of the nationality clauses, and these 
constraints could be driving the frequency-concentration relationship we discovered.  
Negative effects of population and trade volume in some specifications are most probably 
driven by the airlines’ hub-and-spoke networks.  Open skies agreements sometimes imply 
a negligible or even a negative effect on frequency; but the effect of market liberalization 
on the passenger volumes is clearly positive. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
Our data analysis showed that airlines excluded from the partnerships with antitrust 
immunity end up decreasing their frequency of service, and experience lower passenger 
traffic volumes (mostly due to a lower load factor rather than the use of smaller aircraft) 
for their services to the immunized alliance members’ hub airports.  This is consistent 
with the market foreclosure hypothesis we postulated.  This subsection addresses the 
question of whether the foreclosure which we detected is pro- or anti-competitive. 
 Before we proceed, several points need to be stressed.  First, we do not study the 
price effects of antitrust immunity. This mainly has to do with the fact that  complete and 
reliable price data for this market is not available – publicly available datasets only 
include information on pricing by the US carriers and partnerships including US 
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airlines19).  Thus, all claims we are making in this subsection will be based on results for 
passenger traffic volumes, and can sometimes be interpreted differently depending on 
what one believes about the nature of competition in the commercial passenger airline 
industry.  Second, the transatlantic airline market had for some time exhibited 
competition between several airline partnerships with antitrust immunity – this will also 
influence the interpretation of our findings.  Third, in our discussion of foreclosure 
effects we will ignore any possible effects of services having more stops than the ones 
under consideration. 
 Recall from our earlier discussion that several types of international markets can 
be defined relative to the structure of partner airline’s networks.  Specifically, we will 
evaluate the implications of our results for the following categories of markets: 
 Markets for travel between the immunized alliance members’ hubs (e.g, 
Amsterdam - Minneapolis); 
 Markets for travel between the competing alliance members’ hub airports (e.g., 
Amsterdam – Chicago); 
 Markets for travel from an immunized alliance member’s hub airport to non-hub 
airports (e.g., Frankfurt – Boston); 
 Beyond-the-gateway to alliance member’s hub airport market (e.g., Tucson to 
Amsterdam); 
 Beyond-the-gateway to beyond-the-gateway markets (e.g., Tucson to Turin). 
Let us consider these market categories one by one. 
 
Routes between alliance members’ hub airports 
Previous literature identified these markets as the most likely candidates for abuse of 
market power by partner airlines as the existence of a partnership (especially the one 
backed by antitrust immunity) leads to reduced competition on those routes.  There is 
however little support for this claim in the empirical literature.  We observe that antitrust 
immunity leads to higher frequency of service and higher passenger volumes on those 
markets.  Of course, most of the additional passengers on Amsterdam-Minneapolis flights 
                                                 
19 Thus, available data are most suitable for studying price effects of airline partnerships on the beyond-the-
gateway routes (e.g., Brueckner, 2003) 
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do not travel from Amsterdam to Minneapolis, but use this flight as a segment in their 
journey.  At the same time, Minneapolis – Amsterdam customers benefit from the 
increased frequency of service and the consequent decrease in the total price of travel; not 
to mention that antitrust immunity can be responsible for the very existence of non-stop 
services between the partners’ hub airports20.  
 
Routes between competitors’ hub airports 
On these routes we suspected foreclosure to lead to a decline in the frequency and/or 
passenger volumes.  We did not find robust support for our contention in the data.  
However, the results of the data analysis for the sub-samples of ‘steady’ services do point 
to a 5-6 percent decline in passenger volumes on such routes.  That is, members of 
competing alliances with antitrust immunity may foreclose each other on these routes.  
Therefore, there is some (although not conclusive) evidence of potential anti-competitive 
effects of market foreclosure on those markets. 
 
Routes from immunized alliance members to non-hub airports 
Our data analysis suggests that we observe strengthening market power on these routes 
by the airlines included in partnerships with antitrust immunity, as their passenger 
volume increases, and that of the excluded carriers declines.  On duopoly markets falling 
in this category (we rarely see competition by more than two airlines on these routes), our 
regression coefficients suggest a zero to slightly negative net effects for antitrust 
immunity on passenger volumes.  The airline with a membership in an alliance with 
antitrust immunity obtains an advantage over its excluded competitor.  The net effect of 
this development on prices will crucially depend on the nature of competition between 
the carriers.  Overall, we can conclude that foreclosure may yield anti-competitive 
outcomes on these markets. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 As an example, Austrian operated non-stop flights to Atlanta only while it had antitrust immunity for its 
partnership with Delta. 
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Beyond-the-gateway to alliance member’s hub airport routes 
Passengers on those routes are required to make one transfer before (or after) crossing the 
ocean.  Antitrust immunity leads to a clearly dominant position of the partnership whose 
member operates hub airports across the ocean.  For instance, Skyteam alliance will 
obtain a dominant position on the Tucson to Amsterdam market.  This is yet another 
category of markets where our data analysis results suggest a potential for 
anticompetitive effects of antitrust immunity via market foreclosure. 
 
Beyond-the-gateway to beyond-the-gateway routes 
Passengers on these routes are probably the biggest winners from antitrust immunity, as 
actually suggested by Kasper and Lee (2009).  When traveling within an alliance, 
passengers on those markets invariably use the route between the alliance members’ hubs 
as a segment in their journey.  A higher frequency of service on the route between the 
hubs means, other things equal, that antitrust immunity will allow partner airlines to 
connect more beyond-the-gateway endpoints on both sides of the ocean with their 
services.  The existence of several such airline partnerships ensures at least some degree 
of competition for passengers on those routes. 
 Overall, our results suggest that bringing the possibility of market foreclosure as a 
result of antitrust immunity into consideration allows us to point to the possibility of anti-
competitive effects on markets which have generally been considered immune to lower 
competition as a result of increased airline cooperation.  For instance, it has been believed 
that airline alliances should not affect competition on routes from alliance members’ hub 
airports to non-hub gateways.  We show that this might not be true, and suggest that 
competition on all markets involving hub airport of a member of an alliance with 
antitrust immunity can decrease through market foreclosure. 
 To conclude this section, let us evaluate implications of our results for the 
recently granted antitrust immunity to the Continental Airlines’ partnership with 
European members of Star Alliance.21  Simply put, the only routes where we can expect a 
                                                 
21 Up to October 2009, Continental Airlines was not a member of any global airline alliance; however, it 
did have codesharing agreements with Delta, Northwest, and Virgin Atlantic, among others.  In July 2009 
the Continental partnership with EU Star Alliance members was granted antitrust immunity, and in October 
2009 the carrier officially became a member of Star Alliance. 
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reduction in non-stop passenger traffic and number of flights are the markets between 
Continental Airlines’ hubs (Houston, Newark, Cleveland) and hub airports of the 
Skyteam members (most notably Amsterdam and Paris).  We will also see more 
Continental Airlines’ airplanes in Frankfurt (the carrier announced its move to the 
Lufthansa terminal shortly after joining Star Alliance).  Any effect on beyond-the-
gateway to Star Alliance hubs’ markets will likely be marginal.  On these routes, some 
travelers will obtain another possible routing within Star Alliance (so that alliance will 
effectively compete against itself), which should yield benefits to customers.  On some 
routes (most notably from points in Texas), where travel to European Star Alliance 
members’ hubs was offered via either Houston or Dallas on previously non-allied 
Continental or American Airlines, Continental’s position will become stronger, and 
competition may decrease (in the worst case scenario, American may stop serving cities 
like Frankfurt or Zurich out of Dallas). 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The theoretical literature has suggested that members of international airline partnership 
might have an incentive to foreclose the beyond-the-gateway markets to the airlines 
excluded from the respective alliance.  It has also been suggested that such foreclosure 
will likely be most effective when alliance partners have the right to jointly set fares for 
the interline services, and engage in revenue sharing arrangements – a privilege otherwise 
known as antitrust immunity.  This paper analyzes and quantifies effects of such market 
foreclosure. 
 We conduct an extensive analysis of the data on non-stop services on the 
transatlantic scheduled commercial passenger airline market.  Merging the data with the 
information on the structure of the airlines’ networks and dynamics of the airline 
partnerships on the same market over the time period from 1992 to 2008, we are able to 
analyze whether the airlines enjoying antitrust immunity take steps to exclude interline 
passengers arriving on the rival carriers’ flights.  We find that antitrust immunity leads to 
a 2.5–6 percent (0.7–1.5 percent in dynamic panel data GMM estimation) decrease in 
frequency of service by the non-alliance carriers serving a newly immunized hub.  The 
effect on the passenger volumes is even greater (4.8 to 8.5 percent drop in fixed effects, 
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2.6 to 3.5 percent in GMM; and generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency).  This 
suggests excluded airlines switch to smaller aircrafts and/or end up with lower load 
factors on their services to the newly immunized hubs.  We also find evidence (less 
robust, however) that antitrust immunity may lead to lower passenger volumes on routes 
between the competing alliances’ hubs. 
 Based on our results, we suggest that antitrust immunity may lead to reduced 
competition on all markets (whether non-stop or one-stop) involving alliance members’ 
hub airport(s).  In particular, where an immunized alliance member competes with a non-
alliance carrier, foreclosure following antitrust immunity results in increased market 
share inequality and potentially lower total traffic.  Note that the literature has up to now 
only considered markets for travel between alliance members’ hub airports as candidates 
for lower competition following antitrust immunity.  We effectively expand the set of 
markets where antitrust immunity may yield losses to the traveling public. 
 More generally, our study presents evidence which is somewhat contrary to what 
is found in the general empirical literature on market foreclosure.  Most studies suggest 
that foreclosure appears to be pro-competitive; we suppose that the competitive effects of 
market foreclosure might depend on market characteristics.  Admittedly, we are unable to 
analyze the price effects of market foreclosure, and antitrust immunity may bring about 
cost synergies which will be passed along to travelers in the form of lower airfares, 
offsetting the negative effects we detect.  However, available data does not allow 
conducting a detailed welfare analysis and lower passenger volumes at the market level 
are generally not consistent with potentially lower fares. 
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Table 2: Airport-pair market fixed effects 
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable 
Independent Variable 
Entire sample Legacy carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample 
Legacy 
carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only 
Constant 2.055 (0.078) 
2.734 
(0.073) 
2.619 
(0.105) 
3.438 
(0.104) 
7.179 
(0.093) 
7.666 
(0.087) 
7.750 
(0.116) 
8.082 
(0.108) 
HHI 0.273 (0.013) 
0.253 
(0.010) 
0.312 
(0.013) 
0.264 
(0.011) 
0.352 
(0.015) 
0.382 
(0.013) 
0.396 
(0.015) 
0.387 
(0.013) 
Average population 1.18E-07 (1.54E-08) 
1.43E-07 
(1.43E-08) 
-4.08E-08 
(2.40E-08) 
-8.71E-08 
(2.43E-08) 
6.33E-08 
(1.83E-08) 
6.18E-08 
(1.70E-08) 
-1.43E-07 
(2.85E-08) 
-9.04E-08 
(2.75E-08) 
Average per capita 
income 
1.67E-05 
(1.53E-06) 
9.00E-06 
(1.52E-06) 
1.28E-05 
(1.93E-06) 
3.89E-06 
(1.83E-06) 
1.92E-05 
(1.91E-06) 
2.06E-05 
(1.74E-06) 
1.41E-05 
(2.32E-06) 
1.47E-05 
(1.94E-06) 
Between immunized 
hubs 
0.153 
(0.010) 
0.135 
(0.010) 
0.141 
(0.010) 
0.126 
(0.011) 
0.299 
(0.013) 
0.241 
(0.013) 
0.282 
(0.013) 
0.225 
(0.014) 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
0.073 
(0.007) 
0.070 
(0.008) 
0.052 
(0.007) 
0.054 
(0.008) 
0.167 
(0.009) 
0.123 
(0.009) 
0.145 
(0.009) 
0.086 
(0.009) 
Between competitors’ 
hubs 
-0.009* 
(0.010) 
3.1E-04* 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.029 
(0.011) 
0.030 
(0.012) 
-0.010* 
(0.012) 
0.051 
(0.012) 
0.004* 
(0.012) 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
-0.105 
(0.008) 
-0.121 
(0.008) 
-0.050 
(0.008) 
-0.055 
(0.009) 
-0.166 
(0.010) 
-0.186 
(0.010) 
-0.099 
(0.012) 
-0.103 
(0.012) 
Trade volume 9.67E-08 (1.85E-07) 
5.82E-08 
(1.68E-07) 
-4.02E-07 
(1.64E-07) 
-6.88E-07 
(1.65E-07) 
-1.05E-06 
(2.16E-07) 
-6.44E-07 
(1.95E-07) 
-1.68E-06 
(2.14E-07) 
-1.16E-06 
(1.93E-07) 
Visa waiver 0.075* (0.030) 
0.076* 
(0.021) 
0.074* 
(0.028) 
0.055 
(0.021) 
0.035* 
(0.028) 
0.072 
(0.023) 
0.017* 
(0.027) 
0.050 
(0.023) 
Open skies agreement -0.013 (0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
0.021 
(0.008) 
0.053 
(0.008) 
0.062 
(0.008) 
0.071 
(0.009) 
0.084 
(0.009) 
# of Observations 51896 45923 37353 33242 51896 45923 37353 33242 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6442 0.6294 0.6136 0.5521 0.6644 0.6834 0.6428 0.6495 
Notes: 
1. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
2. Year, month, and airline dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
3. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level 
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Table 3: Airline – airport-pair market fixed effects 
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable 
Independent Variable 
Entire sample Legacy carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample 
Legacy 
carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only 
Constant 2.7718 (0.0654) 
2.8987 
(0.0708) 
3.6226 
(0.0941) 
3.7700 
(0.1018) 
7.7791 
0.0785() 
7.8671 
(0.0838) 
8.3763 
(0.0930) 
8.5213 
(0.0981) 
HHI 0.0948 (0.01268) 
0.1178 
(0.0108) 
0.1017 
(0.0127) 
1.20E-01 
(0.0117) 
0.1109 
(0.0128) 
0.1499 
(0.0107) 
0.1102 
(0.0126) 
0.1436 
(0.0123) 
Average population 1.31E-07 (1.23E-08) 
1.45E-07 
(1.29E-08) 
-1.20E-07 
(2.28E-08) 
-1.26E-07 
(2.40E-08) 
5.18E-08 
(1.50E-08) 
5.25E-08 
(1.62E-08) 
-1.43E-07 
(2.16E-08) 
-1.75E-07 
(2.35E-08) 
Average per capita 
income 
1.28E-05 
(1.32E-06) 
9.16E-06 
(1.24E-06) 
6.33E-06 
(1.48E-06) 
4.58E-06 
(1.54E-06) 
2.28E-05 
(1.41E-06) 
2.04E-05 
(1.43E-06) 
1.56E-05 
(1.54E-06) 
1.49E-05 
(1.62E-06) 
Between immunized 
hubs 
0.1289 
(0.0089) 
0.1246 
(0.0087) 
0.1403 
(0.0093) 
0.1411 
(0.0091) 
0.2536 
(0.0120) 
0.2405 
(0.0122) 
0.2550 
(0.0127) 
0.2468 
(0.0136) 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
0.0111 
(0.0055) 
0.0052* 
(0.0057) 
0.0252 
(0.0065) 
0.0259 
(0.0066) 
0.0423 
(0.0064) 
0.0279 
(0.0065) 
0.0487 
(0.0070) 
0.0402 
(0.0070) 
Between competitors’ 
hubs 
0.0130* 
(0.0099) 
0.0081* 
(0.0098) 
0.0319 
(0.0097) 
0.0346 
(0.0095) 
0.0105* 
(0.0113) 
-0.0069* 
(0.0105) 
0.0100* 
(0.0112) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0103) 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
-0.0259 
(0.0059) 
-0.0277 
(0.0075) 
-0.0293 
(0.0061) 
-0.0298 
(0.0077) 
-0.0486 
(0.0074) 
-0.0511 
(0.0079) 
-0.0614 
(0.0083) 
-0.0596 
(0.0088) 
Trade volume -2.85E-07 (1.33E-07) 
-8.42E-08* 
(1.23E-07) 
-6.39E-07 
(1.54E-07) 
-8.04E-07 
(1.51E-07) 
-1.20E-06 
(1.70E-07) 
-1.04E-06 
(1.85E-07) 
-1.39E-06 
(1.72E-07) 
-1.55E-06 
(1.86E-07) 
Visa waiver 0.1960 (0.0206) 
0.1819 
(0.0207) 
0.1790 
(0.0202) 
0.1661 
(0.0202) 
0.1741 
(0.0253) 
0.1718 
(0.0244) 
0.1468 
(0.0245) 
0.1469 
(0.0234) 
Open skies agreement -0.0169 (0.0058) 
-0.0056* 
(0.0058) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0073) 
0.0150 
(0.0068) 
0.0326 
(0.0054) 
0.0395 
(0.0053) 
0.0615 
(0.0070) 
0.0705 
(0.0068) 
# of Observations 51896 45923 37353 33242 51896 45923 37353 33242 
Adjusted R-squared 0.81406 0.75943 0.76892 0.68249 0.83522 0.80975 0.80397 0.76148 
Notes: 
1. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
2. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
3. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level 
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Table 4: Results for ‘steady’ services 
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable 
Independent Variable 
Entire sample Legacy carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample 
Legacy 
carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only 
Constant 1.9367 (0.0707) 
1.8163 
(0.0728) 
1.6271 
(0.0982) 
1.7221 
(0.1008) 
7.0183 
(0.0926) 
6.8522 
(0.0959) 
6.5029 
(0.1185) 
6.5661 
(0.1145) 
HHI 0.0737 (0.0116) 
0.0667 
(0.0117) 
0.0804 
(0.0121) 
0.0738 
(0.0124) 
0.1020 
(0.0139) 
0.0972 
(0.0139) 
0.1087 
(0.0155) 
0.1055 
(0.0156) 
Average population 3.00E-07 (1.03E-08) 
3.37E-07 
(1.09E-08) 
4.33E-07 
(1.90E-08) 
4.20E-07 
(1.97E-08) 
2.24E-07 
(1.40E-08) 
2.67E-07 
(1.49E-08) 
3.70E-07 
(2.15E-08) 
3.61E-07 
(2.11E-08) 
Average per capita 
income 
2.08E-05 
(8.94E-07) 
2.14E-05 
(8.92E-07) 
2.39E-05 
(1.39E-06) 
2.29E-05 
(1.40E-06) 
3.35E-05 
(1.20E-06) 
3.46E-05 
(1.20E-06) 
3.57E-05 
(1.70E-06) 
3.50E-05 
(1.64E-06) 
Between immunized 
hubs 
0.1484 
(0.0112) 
0.1541 
(0.0115) 
0.1730 
(0.0145) 
0.1823 
(0.0152) 
0.2211 
(0.0116) 
0.2244 
(0.0119) 
0.2300 
(0.0138) 
0.2352 
(0.0146) 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
0.0040* 
(0.0064) 
0.0022* 
(0.0064) 
0.0182 
(0.0073) 
0.0239 
(0.0073) 
0.0333 
(0.0074) 
0.0295 
(0.0073) 
0.0404 
(0.0084) 
0.0432 
(0.0084) 
Between competitors’ 
hubs 
-0.0743 
(0.0096) 
-0.0717 
(0.0096) 
-0.0469 
(0.0117) 
-0.0388 
(0.0122) 
-0.0604 
(0.0115) 
-0.0610 
(0.0115) 
-0.0575 
(0.0125) 
-0.0543 
(0.0130) 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
-0.0462 
(0.0084) 
-0.0612 
(0.0090) 
-0.0445 
(0.0115) 
-0.0555 
(0.0119) 
-0.0691 
(0.0078) 
-0.0857 
(0.0083) 
-0.0694 
(0.0119) 
-0.0825 
(0.0126) 
Trade volume 1.12E-06 (1.43E-07) 
1.05E-06 
(1.42E-07) 
1.21E-06 
(1.74E-07) 
1.01E-06 
(1.83E-07) 
-1.22E-06 
(1.63E-07) 
-1.25E-06 
(1.66E-07) 
-9.60E-07 
(1.62E-07) 
-1.09E-06 
(1.65E-07) 
Visa waiver 0.3435 (0.0342) 
0.3502 
(0.0344) 
0.3782 
(0.0349) 
0.3758 
(0.0349) 
0.3263 
(0.0312) 
0.3347 
(0.0314) 
0.3498 
(0.0322) 
0.3493 
(0.0321) 
Open skies agreement 0.0132* (0.0073) 
0.0091* 
(0.0076) 
0.0476 
(0.0103) 
0.0433 
(0.0104) 
0.0496 
(0.0087) 
0.0465 
(0.0089) 
0.0831 
(0.0108) 
0.0790 
(0.0110) 
# of Observations 18862 18461 11791 11593 18862 18461 11791 11593 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8028 0.79314 0.66465 0.66237 0.84585 0.84353 0.78110 0.78439 
Notes: 
1. Sample includes only those airline-market cross-sections, which appear in the data at least for 190 months (out of 204 maximum possible) 
2. Number of cross-sections: entire sample – 93; legacy carriers only – 91; exclude UK – 58; legacy carriers and excluding UK – 57. 
3. Model employed – airline – market fixed effects. 
4. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses. 
5. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported. 
6. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level 
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Table 5: Dynamic panel data GMM model results 
Logarithm of frequency is dependent variable Logarithm of total passengers is dependent variable 
Independent Variable 
Entire sample Legacy carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only Entire sample 
Legacy 
carriers only 
Excluding 
UK 
Exclude UK, 
legacy only 
HHI 0.0473 (0.0030) 
0.0639 
(0.00146) 
0.0549 
(0.0020) 
0.0723 
(0.0011) 
0.0639 
(0.0035) 
0.0889 
(0.0017) 
0.0606 
(0.0028) 
0.0873 
(0.0018) 
Average population 7.59E-08 (2.43E-09) 
8.31E-08 
(1.48E-09) 
-5.88E-08 
(4.61E-09) 
-6.61E-08 
(3.56E-09) 
4.16E-08 
(3.18E-09) 
4.00E-08 
(1.29E-09) 
-7.26E-08 
(6.63E-09) 
-9.46E-08 
(5.13E-09) 
Average per capita 
income 
6.88E-06 
(3.98E-07) 
5.43E-06 
(2.47E-07) 
3.45E-06 
(3.48E-07) 
3.16E-06 
(2.36E-07) 
1.35E-05 
(5.89E-07) 
1.24E-05 
(2.74E-07) 
9.70E-06 
(5.15E-07) 
8.72E-06 
(4.26E-07) 
Between immunized 
hubs 
0.0726 
(0.0034) 
0.0691 
(0.0022) 
0.0805 
(0.0025) 
0.0840 
(0.0019) 
0.1397 
(0.0053) 
0.1358 
(0.0023) 
0.1405 
(0.0034) 
0.1382 
(0.0017) 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
0.0115 
(0.0014) 
0.0062 
(0.0008) 
0.0188 
(0.0011) 
0.0187 
(0.0008) 
0.0281 
(0.0020) 
0.0197 
(0.0007) 
0.0312 
(0.0016) 
0.0272 
(0.0012) 
Between competitors’ 
hubs 
0.0156 
(0.0018) 
0.0100 
(0.0014) 
0.0238 
(0.0020) 
0.0254 
(0.0012) 
0.0136 
(0.0036) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0018) 
0.0092 
(0.0022) 
0.0036 
(0.0014) 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
-0.0079 
(0.0014) 
-0.0109 
(0.0010) 
-0.0118 
(0.0012) 
-0.0151 
(0.0010) 
-0.0267 
(0.0023) 
-0.0284 
(0.0012) 
-0.0355 
(0.0018) 
-0.0340 
(0.0012) 
Trade volume -6.33E-08* (5.26E-08) 
1.36E-08* 
(2.93E-08) 
-2.45E-07 
(3.42E-08) 
-4.23E-07 
(3.04E-08) 
-5.02E-07 
(6.61E-08) 
-4.72E-07 
(3.67E-08) 
-6.53E-07 
(5.65E-08) 
-7.55E-07 
(3.61E-08) 
Visa waiver 0.0976 (0.0031) 
0.0967 
(0.00204) 
0.0946 
(0.0022) 
0.0947 
(0.0016) 
0.0968 
(0.0092) 
0.1089 
(0.0051) 
0.0882 
(0.0042) 
0.0944 
(0.0039) 
Open skies agreement -0.0087 (0.0010) 
-0.0016* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0011 
(0.0014) 
0.0093 
(0.0010) 
0.0173 
(0.0019) 
0.0226 
(0.0012) 
0.0344 
(0.0019) 
0.0429 
(0.0014) 
# of Observations 47610 42838 34354 30954 47610 42838 34354 30954 
P-value of Hansen J 
statistic 0.0311 0.2802 0.8484 0.9836 0.0205 0.1192 0.7180 0.9892 
Notes: 
1. Each specification includes first and second lag of the dependent variable 
2. Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects 
3. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
5. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level
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Table 6: Effects on aircraft size and load factors 
(a) Airline-market fixed effects 
Specification Between immunized hubs 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
Between 
competitors’ hubs 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
Entire sample 0.0089* (0.0056) 
0.0159 
(0.0031) 
-0.0346 
(0.0052) 
-0.0066 
(0.0034) 
Legacy carriers 
only 
0.0082* 
(0.0055) 
0.0141 
(0.0031) 
-0.0359 
(0.0052) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0041) 
Excluding UK 0.0053* (0.0057) 
0.0018* 
(0.0038) 
-0.0432 
(0.0059) 
-0.0057* 
(0.0042) 
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
aircraft size 
Excluding UK, 
legacy only 
0.0044* 
(0.0057) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0039) 
-0.0450 
(0.0059) 
0.0002* 
(0.0051) 
Entire sample 0.1247 (0.0124) 
0.0311 
(0.0040) 
-0.0024* 
(0.0066) 
-0.0227 
(0.0049) 
Legacy carriers 
only 
0.1158 
(0.0128) 
0.0226 
(0.0040) 
-0.0151 
(0.0065) 
-0.0234 
(0.0053) 
Excluding UK 0.1146 (0.0126) 
0.0235 
(0.0046) 
-0.0219 
(0.0067) 
-0.0320 
(0.0055) 
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
load factor 
Excluding UK, 
legacy only 
0.1056 
(0.0135) 
0.0143 
(0.0049) 
-0.0349 
(0.0069) 
-0.0298 
(0.0061) 
Notes: 
1. All dependent variables, specifications, and sample sizes are identical to those reported in Table 3 
2. Adjusted R-squared and coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in Table 3 
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
4. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level 
 
(b) Dynamic panel data GMM 
Specification Between immunized hubs 
Other immunized 
alliance services 
Between 
competitors’ hubs 
Other services to 
immunized hubs 
Entire sample 0.0012* (0.0007) 
0.0058 
(0.0003) 
-0.0100 
(0.0006) 
-0.0044 
(0.0005) 
Legacy carriers 
only 
-0.0004* 
(0.0003) 
0.0047 
(0.0001) 
-0.0103 
(0.0002) 
-0.0029 
(0.0002) 
Excluding UK 0.0002* (0.0004) 
0.0021 
(0.0002) 
-0.0112 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022 
(0.0003) 
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
aircraft size 
Excluding UK, 
legacy only 
0.0001* 
(0.0004) 
0.0010 
(0.0003) 
-0.0121 
(0.0004) 
-0.0008 
(0.0002) 
Entire sample 0.0578 (0.0024) 
0.0170 
(0.0007) 
0.0001* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0149 
(0.0011) 
Legacy carriers 
only 
0.0502 
(0.0013) 
0.0117 
(0.0004) 
-0.0078 
(0.0007) 
-0.0152 
(0.0005) 
Excluding UK 0.0490 (0.0015) 
0.0124 
(0.0006) 
-0.0110 
(0.0010) 
-0.0190 
(0.0007) 
Dependent 
variable – 
logarithm of 
load factor 
Excluding UK, 
legacy only 
0.0425 
(0.0008) 
0.0073 
(0.0004) 
-0.0176 
(0.0006) 
-0.0178 
(0.0006) 
Notes: 
5. All dependent variables, specifications, and sample sizes are identical to those reported in Table 5 
6. P-values of Hansen statistic and coefficients on control variables are similar to those reported in 
Table 5 
7. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
8. Star indicates lack of significance at 5% level
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Appendix 
 
Timeline of Antitrust Immunity Granting Decisions on the Transatlantic Market: 
 
January 13, 1993, Antitrust immunity involving KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest 
Airlines 
May 20, 1996, United Airlines – Lufthansa pair granted antitrust immunity 
June 14, 1996, Antitrust immunity granted to the following three pairs: 
- Delta Air Lines – Swissair (the partnership ended on August 5, 2000) 
- Delta Air Lines – Sabena (the partnership ended on August 5, 2000) 
- Delta Air Lines – Austrian Airlines (the partnership ended on March 25, 2000) 
Carve-outs: ATL-BRU, ATL-ZRH, CVG-ZRH 
November 1, 1996, United – SAS receives antitrust immunity 
December 3, 1999, Northwest – Alitalia granted immunity.  The partnership ended in 2000 
May 11, 2000, Antitrust immunity is granted to the following pairs: 
- American Airlines – Swissair (ended following Swissair bankruptcy on March 31, 2002) 
- American Airlines – Sabena (ended upon Sabena bankruptcy on November 7, 2001) 
January 26, 2001, United – Austrian, and United – Lauda granted antitrust immunity 
January 18, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to the following pairs of carriers: 
- Delta Air Lines – Air France 
- Delta Air Lines – Alitalia 
- Delta Air Lines – Czech Airlines 
April 4, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to United Airlines – British Midland (BMI), 
conditional on open-skies agreement between US and UK within the next six months 
July 30, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – Finnair 
November 22, 2002, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – Swiss International 
Airlines (ended in 2005) 
April 15, 2004, Antitrust immunity granted to American Airlines – SN Brussels Airlines 
February 13, 2007, First multi-airline antitrust immunity granted to the alliance consisting of 
United Airlines and the following EU partners: Austrian, BMI, Lot Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, 
SAS, Swiss, and TAP Air Portugal (all members of Star Alliance) 
May 22, 2008, Six-way antitrust immunity granted to the following members of Skyteam 
Alliance: Delta, Northwest, Alitalia, Czech, KLM, Air France.  Note that same airlines’ first 
application for six-way immunity was denied on February 6, 2006 
 
 
